By Glenn R. Parker
What might you do if, the very day you have been employed, you knew you may be unemployed in as low as years? you'll search possibilities on your present task to advance a portfolio of abilities and contacts in an effort to make your self extra beautiful to destiny employers. Representatives and senators take into consideration their jobs in Congress during this approach, in line with Glenn R. Parker.While in place of work, participants of Congress plan no longer simply for the following election yet for the subsequent degree in their careers. by way of networking, serving on committees, and championing specific laws, they intentionally acquire human capital---expertise, networks, and reputation---which later will supply them bargaining energy within the task marketplace. Parker's examine of the postelective careers of greater than two hundred former individuals of Congress, either U.S. representatives and senators, who've left place of work over the past part century exhibits that such strategic making plans usually succeeds. more often than not, the human capital those politicians collected whereas in workplace elevated their occupational mobility and incomes power.Capitol Investments bargains a cosmopolitan but obtainable research of the purchase and marketability of political talents. It means that an know-how of the alternate in human capital shapes an officeholder's activities up to the need to win one other election.Glenn R. Parker is individual Professor within the division of Political technology at Purdue collage.
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Extra resources for Capitol Investments: The Marketability of Political Skills (Economics, Cognition, and Society)
For example, repeated reelection does not enhance the likelihood of success in the next election (Erikson 1976, 630) and thus does not eliminate thoughts of postelective employment. Furthermore, subjective assessments of electoral Politicians, Institutions, and Human Capital • 33 safety may be far more relevant to legislators than are objective measures of marginality. “Once having gone through a testing election, early or late, a member will entertain the possibility of its recurrence forever.
Lobbying thus does not for the most part represent a major occupational transition. We expect, therefore, that legislators will be attracted to lobbying because their skills and training are most appropriate to this vocation and because the market for legislators—if they want to change careers—is somewhat narrow, thereby foreclosing numerous employment options. Just as we have found that going to prison makes criminals more pro‹cient at committing crimes, so too, legislators serving long tenure in Congress are apt to become skilled at lobbying.
Nor is the rivalry associated with competition among like-minded interests apt to provide conditions for legislators to leverage their training. Legislators normally work for large economic sectors or industries where rivalry is unlikely to transpire because of the collective nature of the policies they seek (Olson 1968), the incentives to logroll intergroup con›icts (Lowi 1969), and the desire to avoid unnecessary expenditures of political in›uence and resources (Becker 1983). Elections Reelection is central to most explanations of legislative behavior, and it plays a role in our theory, too.