By Silva Marzetti, Roberto Scazzieri (editors)
This volume addresses the subject of uncertainty from the viewpoint of a longer perception of rationality. specifically, the contributions discover the premises and implications of believable reasoning while possibilities are non-measurable or unknown, and whilst the distance of attainable occasions is barely partly pointed out.
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Additional info for Fundamental Uncertainty: Rationality and Plausible Reasoning
1992), Likelihood (expanded edn), Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. Galavotti, M. C. (2005), Philosophical Introduction to Probability, Stanford: CSLI Publications. Galavotti, M. , Scazzieri, R. and Suppes, P. (eds) (2008a), Reasoning, Rationality and Probability, Stanford: CSLI Publications. ——— (2008b), ‘Introduction’, in M. C. Galavotti, R. Scazzieri and P. Suppes (eds), Reasoning, Rationality and Probability, Stanford: CSLI Publications, pp. 1–9. Gardenfors, P. (1990), ‘Induction, Conceptual Spaces and AI’, Philosophy of Science, 57, pp.
To conclude, fundamental uncertainty points to a requirement of extended rationality and highlights that prudence may be essential in the application of it. 20 Introduction Notes 1. See Descartes (1986 [1637, 1641, 1644]); Davidson (1980). 2. We follow here F. Giunchiglia’s distinction between ‘situation’, as a way to record ‘the state of the world as it is, independently of how it is represented in the mind of the reasoner’ (Giunchiglia, 1993, p. 146), and ‘context’ as ‘a theory of the world which encodes an individual’s subjective perspective about it’ (Giunchiglia, 1993, p.
It is this that led Ramsey to the view that it did not belong to formal logic “to say what a man’s expectation of drawing a black ball” should be. This is what divides them: Keynes sees an indefinable logical relation where Ramsey sees nothing. Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. 33 It is perhaps the current atmosphere of relativism that makes it hard to come to a judgement about this issue. After all, if a man cannot “see” that in itself pleasure is better than pain, what arguments can sway him? If the tortoise cannot “see” that modus ponens is truth preserving, to what argument form can Achilles’ turn?