By Ursula F. Ott (auth.)
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Task-related criteria refer to those variables being related to the viability of a proposed venture’s operation and include patents or technological know-how, ﬁnancial resources, experienced managerial personnel and access to marketing and distribution systems. Whereas partner-related criteria refer to those variables like the partner’s national or corporate culture, the degree of favorable past association between the partners, compatibility of management teams and organizational size and structure of the partner.
Fudenberg, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) analyzed lifelong and single period contracts as well as moderate term contracts such as employment contracts. Their results suggest that the beneﬁts of extending contract length are positively related to the length and extent of the information lag. Contracts can, therefore, be designed to balance the gains from incorporating all the information relevant to the current contract period against the costs of lengthening the contract term. The employee turnover in jobs that do not exhibit substantial information lags is higher than in jobs that do.
Nevertheless, the complexity of an IJV combining at least technological know-how of one parent with market knowledge of the other parent bears a problem of offering the right incentives to reveal the information necessary for the success of the joint enterprise. Under the assumption that the IJV has private information about the quality of the management in terms of co-operation, the parents are interested to induce the agent to reveal his information about his ability by the contract he accepts.